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  Two Theories of Money Reconciled: The Colonial Puzzle  
Revisited with New Evidence
* 
  The purported failure of the classical quantity theory of money in the colonial  
  economy is shown to be a failure of data and not a failure of theory. When new  
  data on the quantity of specie in circulation is added to the current data on paper    
  money and prices, and econometrically estimated in both short- and long-run  
  monetary models, the long-debated anomaly regarding the performance of the  
  classical quantity theory of money in the colonial economy disappears. How paper  
  money was backed and could be exchanged for specie was important, but not in  
  the way theorists assert. (JEL N11 E42) 
 
  The colonies of British North America were the first modern Western economies to 
experiment with large-scale government issuances of fiat paper money. For colonies south of 
Massachusetts, West (1978) found no statistical relationship between the quantity of paper 
money and prices. This apparent violation of the classical version of the quantity theory of 
money (Fisher 1912, Friedman 1956, Lucas 1980) produced two schools of thought regarding 
paper money in colonial America. “Backing” theorists (Calomiris 1988a, 1988b; Smith 1985a, 
1985b, 1988; Wicker 1985) argue that the value of paper money depends on how that money was 
issued, backed, and withdrawn from circulation. If credibly backed, large changes in the quantity 
of paper money would have no effect on prices. Conversely, “quantity” theorists (McCallum 
1992; Michener 1987, 1988) note that a colony’s total money supply was composed of both 
paper money issued by that colony’s legislature and specie coins acquired and lost through 
foreign trade (MT = Mp + Ms, respectively). They also claim that Mp and Ms were perfect 
substitutes. Any lack of a statistical relationship between Mp and prices may have been due to 
currency substitution between Mp and Ms. If MT were related to prices, the classical quantity 





hence MT, exist, the debate between these two schools of thought has remained unresolved.
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  In this study, I use new data on Ms per year in Pennsylvania—the first of its kind ever 
constructed for colonial America—to test the performance of the quantity theory of money using 
MT rather than Mp. These tests show that the classical version of the quantity theory of money 
performs well. The data also show that while the “quantity” theorists are correct, it is not via the 
mechanism they claim. As such, the monetary experience of colonial America, at least for 
Pennsylvania, presents no anomaly to the classical quantity theory of money (Fisher 1912, 
Friedman 1956, Lucas 1980). There is a strong long-run relationship between money and prices, 
but in the short-run large temporary movements in aggregate output (Y) and velocity (V) are still 
possible. 
  RETESTING THE WEST (1978) SHORT-RUN MODEL 
  Following the classical assumptions of constant long-run growth in Y and V, West (1978) 
estimated the model [ln(PI)i = Constant + b*ln(Mp)i], where PI = the price index. For New York, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina (the only colonies south of Massachusetts for which price 
indices exist), even when adding up to two lagged values of Mp, he found no statistically 
significant relationship between PI and Mp. The lack of a statistically significant relationship 
between PI and Mp for New York and South Carolina could easily be due to poor-quality price 
data and small sample sizes. The data for Pennsylvania, however, are generally regarded to be of 
superior quality. As such, the lack of a statistically significant relationship between PI and Mp 
for Pennsylvania is the empirical cornerstone for the current puzzle over colonial monetary 
performance. West’s results for Pennsylvania are reproduced in Table 1—Section I, Part A. He 
(1978, p. 5) concluded, “The Philadelphia regressions are interesting and important. They cover 





1723, until 1775, inflation and the issue of paper money seems to be unrelated. One can place 
great confidence in these results since the price data for Philadelphia are very good.” 
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  [Place Table 1 Here] 
  Using the same model and data, West’s (1978) results for Pennsylvania were replicated 
in Table 1—Section I, Part B. While the results differ from those originally reported by West, 
they do not differ enough to necessarily overturn his conclusion.
3  Next, West’s model is re-
estimated using MT in place of Mp, see Table 1—Section II. Slightly different years must be 
used because Ms, and hence MT, is only known for 1729 through 1775. This difference does not 
affect the results. Compared with the results using only Mp, the relationship between PI and MT 
is substantially improved, i.e., substantially higher R
2s and statistical significance on the money 
coefficients. While these results are not overwhelming, they are still strong given that this model 
is a short-run test of a long-run proposition. No one claims that ln(Y) and ln(V) are universal 
constants with no short-run cyclical movements, i.e., no one claims that b must equal 1 for the 
classical version of the quantity theory of money to hold (Friedman 1956; Lucas 1980, p. 1007). 
If West had reported the results using MT in Table 1— Section II, it is likely that the subsequent 
debate between the “quantity” and the “backing” theorists over colonial monetary performance 
would never have occurred. 
  LONG-RUN TESTS OF THE QUANTITY THEORY OF MONEY 
  The West (1978) model is an improper test of the classical quantity theory of money 
because it is a short-run model (Friedman 1956; Lucas 1980, p. 1007; McCallum 1992, p. 157). 
The classical assumptions that per capita ln(Y) and ln(V) are long-run constants implies that 





level and Pop is population) is stable over the long-run, but not necessarily in the short-run. Per 
capita real money balances from 1729 through 1775 for Pennsylvania are displayed in Figure 1. 
Using these data, the following regression shows that m has no linear trend. Over the long run, 
total real money balances grew at the rate of population.  
m(i)   =   0.347   +  0.002t(i)  {Regression R
2  =  0.002; Total R
2 = 0.821; DW = 1.889.   
 (0.203)    (0.008)  Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are AR2 error 
    corrected  for  serial  correlation. t = time.}
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This result also implies that long-run per capita growth in colonial output equals the long-run 
growth in the velocity of circulation, i.e., ln(Y/Pop) = ln(V). Finally, the following Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test shows that m follows a stationary process. Shocks to m experienced mean 
reversion—with about a three-year half-life to shocks. This long-run stability in m strongly  
 
[m(i) - m(i-1)]  =  0.081  -   0.218 m(i-1)  +   0.620 [m(i-1) - m(i-2)]
  
            (0.033)    (0.069)      (0.132)       
{R
2 = 0.39;  DW = 1.80; Dickey-Fuller F-test  =  5.32. Standard errors are in parentheses.}
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supports the classical version of the quantity theory of money as applied to the colonial 
economy, at least for Pennsylvania.  
[Place Figure 1 Here] 
 ASSESSING THE MECHANISMS OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE COLONIAL ECONOMY 
A. The “Quantity” Theorists’ Model of the Monetary Adjustment Mechanism 
  The “quantity” theorists (McCallum 1992; Michener 1987, 1988) offer a model of the 
monetary adjustment mechanism in the colonial economy that assumes that Mp and Ms are 
instantaneously perfect substitutes at a perfectly defended and forecastable fixed exchange rate 
with zero transactions costs. As long as increases in Mp are not so large that they totally drive 





exports) of Ms leaving MT unchanged. Thus, even large changes in Mp can be unrelated to PI 
because MT per capita remains constant. As such, West (1978) style findings that show no 
relationship between PI and Mp support rather than violate the classical quantity theory of 
money. Only when increases in Mp have totally driven all Ms out of the colony would further 
increases in Mp produce increases in PI. These scholars claim to have saved, at least 
theoretically, the classical quantity theory of money from the challenges put forward by the 
“backing” theorists and by the West (1978) style findings. However, they have saved it by 
rendering it useless as an empirical tool for colony-specific or even regionally-specific monetary 
analysis—for in their model only the global money supply matters. 
  The institutional setting needed to support the required action in this model, however, is 
absent. How the model’s assumed fixed exchange rate between Mp and Ms was defended 
remains a mystery (Smith 1988). While colonial governments accepted specie and their own 
paper money in payment of the taxes they levied at an established rate, what made this rate, 
which could be altered at any time by the legislature, equivalent to a perfectly defended fixed 
exchange rate regime is unclear. Colonial legislatures did not and could not engage in monetary 
micro-management in the very short-run (certainly not like modern central banks). They never 
entered the market to buy and sell their paper money for specie neither to affect nor in reaction to 
exchange rate movements. And to assume that such a fixed exchange rate regime was perfectly 
defended by custom or by a conspiracy of myopic merchant-arbitragers stretches credulity.
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  The fixed exchange rate assumption of the quantity theorists is also hard to square with 
the available data on exchange rates (McCusker 1978). These data are based on the rates stated 
in a large sample of merchant account books between pounds sterling and each colony’s paper 





1740 through 1775 for Pennsylvania are probably the best in terms of frequency, density, and 
quality of observations (McCusker 1978, pp. 185-88). For the 432 months over these 36 years, 
data for only 34 months is missing, and the missing observations are widely scattered. These 
data reveal that in only 11% of the possible paired comparisons were the exchange rates in a 
given month the same as in the subsequent month. And in only 4% of the possible paired 
comparisons were the exchange rates in a given month the same as in the same month in the 
subsequent year. Clearly, the exchange rate was not fixed. Grubb (2003, p. 1786), however, 
shows that despite this volatility, several colonies experienced periods of long-run stability in 
their exchange rates in terms of statistically insignificant linear trends and statistical rejection of 
non-stationarity. But just as periods of constant prices do not imply price controls, periods of 
relative stability in exchange rates do not imply a fixed exchange-rate regime. The long-run 
stability of these exchange rates can be easily accounted for by the lack of trend in, and by the 
stationary behavior of, per capita real money balances (see the prior section). The quantity 
theorists have simply confused exchange-rate stability for exchange-rate fixedness. 
  Finally, the predictions of the quantity theorists’ model of the monetary adjustment 
mechanism have not, to date, been tested because evidence on the yearly amount of Ms in 
circulation has been lacking. These predictions are that Mp and Ms per capita are perfectly 
negatively correlated, and that Ms must dwarf Mp, i.e., Ms/Mp > 1, by a substantial margin for 
PI to remain unrelated to Mp given the observed large movements in Mp. With the new data 
series on Ms for Pennsylvania (Grubb 2004) both these implications can now be tested and, 
when tested, they both fail. First, Ms never exceeds Mp in any year in the sample (see the data in 
the Appendix—Table A). Second, over time Mp and Ms are far from automatically off setting 





during the Seven Year’s War and after 1772. In fact, for the entire sample, 1729-1775, the 
correlation coefficient between per capita cash balances in Mp and in Ms is not negative, but 
positive (+0.47). Only for the years 1762-1772 do per capita Mp and Ms come close to behaving 
like perfect substitutes, with a correlation coefficient in this period of -0.71. For the years before 
1762 and after 1772 combined, the correlation coefficient is +0.51.
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  The problem with the quantity theorists’ model of the monetary adjustment mechanism is 
that it constrains the classical version of the quantity theory of money to hold perfectly in the 
short-run, something it was never intended to do. As such, the model falls victim to the actual 
course of events. The history of the colonial economy reveals frequent, and sometimes massive, 
short-run off-trend shocks connected to wars, political trade disruptions, and so forth. For 
example, the Seven Year’s War occasioned both a massive increase in Mp by colonial 
legislatures and a large inflow of Ms occasioned by British military spending, see Figure 1 
above. The colonial response to the British credit crisis of 1772 (legislative increases in Mp), and 
to British efforts to impose imperial taxes and close Boston harbor (boycotting the import of 
British goods thus reducing the re-export of Ms out of the colonies) had a similar result. It led to 
simultaneous increases in Mp and Ms. While the econometric exercises in the prior sections 
show that the classical version of quantity theory of money performs well in the colonial 
economy, substantial short-run off-trend shocks clearly occurred. 
  In conclusion, the currency-substitution claims made by the quantity theorists are too 
simplistic to account for the empirical evidence. The same evidence shows both that the classical 
quantity theory of money performs well, and that the quantity theorists’ model of the monetary 
adjustment mechanism fails. Therefore, the quantity theorists’ model of the monetary adjustment 






B. The “Backing” Theorists’ Model of the Monetary Adjustment Mechanism 
  The “backing” theorists’ (Calomiris 1988a, 1988b; Smith 1985a, 1985b, 1988; Wicker 
1985) model of the colonial monetary adjustment mechanism makes V a direct negative function 
of Mp. As such, increases in Mp can be perfectly offset by reductions in V, and vice versa, so 
that PI remains unrelated to changes in Mp. This assumption contrasts sharply with the classical 
quantity theory of money that assumes that V is not a direct function of MT in either the short or 
long run. At best, V might be an indirect function of MT, but only in the short-run through MT’s 
transitional or cyclical effect on P and interest rates (Cagan 1956, Fisher 1912, Friedman 1956). 
Given that the econometric exercises in the prior sections show that the classical quantity theory 
of money performs well in the colonial economy, especially in the long-run where ln(V) is 
assumed to be a constant, the backing theorists’ model of the monetary adjustment mechanism is 
only relevant for explaining off-trend or short-run cyclical movements. 
  On some margins the institutional setting needed to support the required action in this 
model is present, while on other margins it is not. For example, the institutional setting for the 
injection and removal of Mp is consistent with backing theory. Colonial governments issued Mp 
in conjunction with specific taxes designed to redeem said Mp at future established dates, or as 
loans to subjects who pledged their land as collateral and adhered to specific repayment 
schedules (Behrens 1923, Brock 1975, Wicker 1985). Colonists could have forecast whether 
these future conditions were likely to be fulfilled. By institutionally linking current monetary 
action with future monetary action, and assuming that colonists could fully anticipate both 
current and future monetary actions, colonists could engage in inter-temporal shifts in savings 





Wallace 1981). One avenue of response would be for colonists to increase their cash holdings 
(decreasing V) when a colony increased its Mp in anticipation of paying the future taxes and 
mortgage payments that were directly tied to that current increase in Mp. Another avenue of 
response would be for colonists to increase their cash holdings (decreasing V) when a colony 
increased its Mp in anticipation of lower future prices produced by the required future reduction 
(redemption) of said Mp. This action would in turn prevent the current increase in Mp from 
pushing up current prices. Thus, unlike the 19th and early 20th centuries, the colonial 
institutional setting may have caused V to be a direct negative function of Mp.
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  On the other hand, whether Mp served as a vehicle for inter-temporal shifts in savings 
and consumption in the colonial economy is doubtful. For large changes in Mp to be completely 
absorbed by changes in V implies large changes in the holding of real cash balances. Because 
government bonds and deposit banking do not exit in the colonial economy, this possibility relies 
on the personal possession of cash being an important asset or store of value rather than just a 
medium of exchange (Laidler 1987, Sargent and Wallace 1981). However, evidence from 
probate inventories shows that possession of cash comprised only 2.4% of total net worth (Jones 
1980, pp. 128-29). The vast majority of wealth was held as land, and the vast majority of 
financial assets were held in non-marketable debt claims. Cash served principally as a medium of 
exchange and not as a store of value. The circulation of Mp was so frequent that Pennsylvania’s 
legislature had to pass, and often renew, an act authorizing the exchange “torn and ragged” bills 
for new bills (Statutes at Large, vol. 4, pp. 203, 414; vol. 5, pp. 48, 60, 192; vol. 7, p. 204).  The 
prerequisite of substantial personal asset-holdings of cash needed for the backing theory’s 
monetary mechanism to work does not appear to have been met by the colonial economy. 





colonists is doubtful. The assumption that colonists could fully anticipate monetary actions is 
necessary to eliminate the possibility that money is non-neutral in the short run (Barro 1977). If 
money is neutral in the short run, then changes in MT can only change P or V in the short run. 
The institutional setting in the backing theory eliminates P, thus leaving only V to change in the 
short run. However, if colonists could not fully anticipate monetary actions, then the non-
neutrality of money in the short run is restored. In 1764 Benjamin Franklin observed that 
injections of paper money “gave new life to business” and “promoted greatly the settlement of 
new land” (Nussbaum 1957, p. 27). This raises the possibility that changes in MT caused short-
run changes in Y rather than V, a possibility that backing theory can only eliminate in the 
colonial economy by assumption. 
  Colonial legislatures engaged in substantive monetary actions in response to large crises, 
such as wars, depression, and trade shocks (Brock 1975, pp. 74-84, 353-91; Lester 1938; 
Pennsylvania Archives; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania). Wars and trade shocks were known 
to be likely near-term events, though exactly when they would occur was not easy to anticipate. 
They were certainly unforecastable five years out. Once a crisis was upon a colony, anticipating 
the course of monetary injections was also difficult. For example, during the Seven Year’s War, 
while colonial legislatures typically authorized the issuance of a given sum of Mp, the actual 
injection of money into the economy to pay soldiers, etc. occurred as needed (Appendix—Table 
B). In addition, because the timing of future new injections of Mp were not contingent on present 
monetary actions, the exact time-path of future MT, despite the required redemption of current 
Mp injections, could not be fully anticipated. Finally, because these monetary injections were 
typically government spending—money put in the hands of soldiers who were non-savers—





  Figure 1 shows the existence of large short-run cyclical or off-trend movements in total 
real cash balances per capita—ln[MT/(P*Pop)]. This is identical to showing large off-trend 
movements in [ln(Y/Pop) - ln(V)]. But because direct credible yearly time series on Y and on V 
do not currently exist, determining what share of this off-trend movement is due to V’s response 
to MT as opposed to movements in Y is currently impossible. The backing theorists’ primary 
empirical test involves finding periods where [ln(Mp/P)] changed by large magnitudes, asserting 
that ln(Ms) is unimportant and that ln(Y ) could not conceivably have changed by such a 
magnitude, and then concluding, by deduction, that substantial changes in ln(V) must have 
occurred. Evidence from the Seven Year’s War provides their key empirical test example (Smith 
1985a, 1988; Wicker 1985). Between 1754 and 1759, total real cash balances per capita in 
Pennsylvania, for example, increased by 147% (see Figure 1 and Appendix—Table A).  On the 
surface, the possibility that per capita Y could increase by 147% over a five-year period seems 
highly improbable. Thus, by deduction, V must have decreased by a substantial percentage. This 
reasoning, however, fails to appreciate the colossal and unprecedented effect the Seven Year’s 
War had on real aggregates as well as on monetary aggregates. For example, between 1754 and 
1759, the value of British exports to the Thirteen Colonies increased by 69%, and the value of 
British export to, minus imports from, the Thirteen Colonies increased by an overwhelming 
232% (derived from Egnal 1998, p. 35; Mitchell and Deane 1962, p. 310). The colonies 
experienced a massive influx and net retention of goods during these five years. The first half of 
the Seven Year’s War, therefore, occasioned both an unprecedented increase in [ln(MT/P)] and 
an unprecedented increase in ln(Y) of potentially similar magnitudes. Finally, as the War ended 
and [ln(MT/P)] declined precipitously (see Figure 1),  Y also declined to depression levels (Egnal 





movement in Y could have left little room for the changes in V required by backing theory. 
Likewise, substantial short-run cyclical changes in Y occurred during the Revolutionary War 
(Buel 1998, Doerflinger 1986, O’Shaughnessy 2000), which makes assessing backing theory 
outcomes during the Revolution (Calomiris 1988a) problematic.  
  In conclusion, if monetary shocks were largely reflected through Y in the short run and 
total real money balances per capita remained constant in the long run, then we are back in a 
classical quantity theory of money world. Until more is known about the exact magnitudes of 
year-to-year changes in Y and V, the backing theory’s mechanism of monetary adjustment as 
applied to the colonial economy must remain speculative. 
  SMITH’S DIRECT ECONOMETRIC TEST OF BACKING VERSUS QUANTITY 
  Maryland’s paper money emission and method of backing for the years 1733 through 
1764 were unique. In 1733 Maryland authorized the issuance of 90,000 Maryland pounds in bills 
of credit (paper money). The quantity of bills in circulation at any one time was less than this 
authorized sum by varying amounts, see Appendix—Table B. While other colonies backed their 
paper money with future taxes and land mortgages, Maryland’s bills were backed through the 
creation of a sinking fund. The money for this fund came from the proceeds of a 15 pence tax on 
every hogshead of tobacco exported from the colony, and was used to purchase Bank of England 
stock. This fund was to be used to redeem the bills in two stages, in each case by converting a 
sufficient amount of the sinking fund into sterling bills of exchange and exchanging them for 
Maryland pounds at a rate of three pounds sterling for every four Maryland pounds. This rate 
was considered the par exchange rate between sterling and Maryland currency. One-third of the 
bills were to be redeemed in 1748. The two-thirds not redeemed in 1748 were to be exchanged at 





Maryland’s sinking fund provides a yearly measure of the current value of what backed 
Maryland’s paper money (Behrens 1923, pp. 12-49; Brock 1975, pp. 99-105, 412-28; Price 
1977).
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  Smith (1985b, pp. 1200-08) used the unique features of Maryland’s monetary system to 
craft a direct econometric test between the quantity of paper money and the backing of paper 
money to see which played a greater role in determining the value of paper money. Smith’s test 
is the only econometric and statistical exercise published after West (1978) on the debate over 
backing versus the quantity of money in the colonial economy. Because Maryland’s backing 
provision consisted of an explicit commitment to swap sterling for Maryland pounds, Smith used 
the yearly data on the sterling-to-Maryland pound exchange rate (McCusker 1978, pp. 202-03) to 
measure changes in the value of the Maryland pound. Given the absence of a commodity price 
index and information on the amount of specie in circulation for Maryland, there was no 
alternative measure. Smith regressed the deviation of the exchange rate from par [Par(i)] on the 
quantity of bills actually in circulation [MMSp(i)], the routine yearly operation of the backing 
regime as measured by the current size of the sinking fund relative to its final size in 1764 
[F(i)/F(1764)], and the credibility of the promise to redeem these bills at par as measured by 
whether Maryland kept its intermediate redemption promise in 1748 [D1748-64 ]. Smith’s results 
are reproduced in Table 2—Section I, Part A. Based on these results, Smith (1985b, pp. 1207-08) 
concluded that “Clearly the quantity of money alone has no impact on currency 
value....[I]ncreases in the market value of the backing for notes result in an appreciation in the 
value of Maryland currency....[A] history of honoring promised redemptions… enhance[s] their 
value.” Smith’s results, however, are a product of peculiar data interpolations and inappropriate 





fail to stand. 
  [Place Table 2 Here] 
  First, Smith’s results are replicated, using his data and model, to make sure that the 
subsequent analysis starts from the same point and the subsequent differences in results are 
purely a product of the changes described. Table 2—Section I, Part B—shows that the data and 
model used here can replicate Smith’s results.
10  Second, Smith’s test for whether Maryland’s 
honoring of its redemption commitment in 1748 affected the exchange rate is examined. He 
modeled this effect by breaking the sample at 1748 and seeing if the years 1748-1764 were 
different than the years 1735-1747 [the D1748-64 dummy variable]. The same results, however, 
can be obtained when breaking the sample at any year between 1744 and 1756. In fact, the best 
econometric result is obtained by dividing the sample at 1744 rather than at 1748. Two of these 
alternative regressions are reported in Table 2—Section I, Part C.
11  Thus, Smith’s result is not 
distinctly an outcome of his hypothesis; a large number of alternative hypotheses could yield the 
same result, such as shocks caused by the beginning or ending of major wars (see Figure 1). 
Maryland’s fulfillment of its redemption commitment in 1748 had no effect on the exchange rate 
distinguishable from any number of other events occurring in the five years on either side of 
1748. Therefore, this measure of backing can be discarded. It lacks statistical and interpretive 
relevance.  
  The third step examines Smith’s measure of the quantity of money in circulation 
[MMSp]. Smith’s measure relies on extensive data interpolation. Of the 30 years of data on this 
variable, 18 are not observations but interpolations (the bracketed numbers in Appendix—Table 
B). In the years before 1756, Smith filled in missing observations with the immediately prior 





for the amount actually in circulation. Smith neither indicated that his data were highly 
interpolated nor offered any justification for his peculiar method of data interpolation. Based on 
the discussions in the original source (Brock 1975, pp. 104, 418-19) I constructed an alternative 
set of interpolated values [MMGp], see Appendix—Table B. Simple linear interpolated values 
are used in place of Smith’s use of immediately prior observations for missing values before 
1756. The paper money authorized in 1756 was put into circulation slowly and then taxed out of 
circulation by 1763. To capture this effect, I used two separate linear interpolations, one from 
1755 to 1759 and another from 1759 to 1764, in place of Smith’s use of the authorized amount, 
for missing values after 1755. When MMGp is used in Smith’s regression model in place of 
MMSp a statistically significant relationship between the quantity of money and Par appears, see 
Table 2—Section II, Part A.  Smith’s (1985b, p. 1207) conclusion, using his econometric 
standards, that “Clearly the quantity of money alone has no impact on currency value...”, is 
overturned.  This result is achieved even without adding the specie component to Maryland’s 
money supply, which is currently unknown, as was done for Pennsylvania above. 
  The final step examines Smith’s empirical measure of Maryland’s backing regime—the 
sinking fund’s value in a given year as a percentage of its final value in 1764. The theoretical 
motivation for this empirical measure lacks clarity. Just because a particular backing regime 
succeeds in replacing the money-price relationship with a money-velocity relationship, it does 
not follow, theoretically, that the routine operation of that regime should be related to changes in 
prices or exchange rates. Smith’s interpretation of his econometric model as a horse race 
between the backing of money and the quantity of money as to which determines the value of 
money, therefore, lacks cogency. 





backing regime, but the likelihood that Maryland would experience a backing regime shift in 
1764, then his measure of backing [F(i)/F(1764)] lacks empirical cogency for it does not capture 
subjects’ expectations in any year about whether Maryland would be able to meet its promised 
redemptions. For example, Maryland would be able to fully redeem its paper money as promised 
in 1748 and 1764, i.e., its paper money would be fully backed, if it were accumulating sufficient 
money each year in its sinking fund so that by 1748 and 1764 it could cover the promised 
redemption. Deviations from this perfect-backing level of accumulation bare little relationship to 
Smith’s measure [F(i)/F(1764)]. A measure of the degree of backing credibility that would capture 
this expectation would be the deviation from the expected trend accumulation needed to just 
meet the promised redemption. The greater the sinking fund’s deviation below this trend, the 
greater the expectation that Maryland would be forced to shift its backing regime, i.e., forced to 
redeem its paper money in 1764 at less than the promised three pounds sterling for every four 
Maryland pounds. 
  Several such measures were tried, but because all yielded the same result only one is 
reported, see Table 2—Section II, Part B.  This measure [Forecasted Backing] equals the 
percentage the actual sinking fund at a given date fell below the linear accumulation rate needed 
to just fulfill the promised redemption in 1764. If Maryland were on this linear accumulation 
rate, they would also be able to fulfill their redemption promise of 1748. This measure assumes 
that subjects knew how many of the bills authorized in 1733 the colony would eventually put 
into circulation. It also assumes that they knew that per-year tobacco exports, and so the tax 
revenue put into the sinking fund each year, would experience zero growth in the long run, and 
that the fund’s stock dividends would largely be offset by commission fees.
12  Thus, a linear 





redemption of the actual sum to be redeemed in 1764 would correspond to perfect backing.  
  The sinking fund was substantially below this “perfect backing” trend accumulation in 
most years. For example, the fund was 50 percent below this trend accumulation in 1744 and 
again in 1758. Only in 1749, was it above and only after 1762 was it only 5 percent or less 
below, this trend accumulation. Maryland actually redeemed its paper currency as promised in 
1748 and 1764. They were able to do so because the sinking fund experienced exceptional 
growth in the years immediately prior to these redemption dates. This exceptional growth was in 
turn due to fortuitous peaks in tobacco exports and hence in the tax revenue contributions to the 
fund in 1747-48 and again in 1763-64 (Historical Statistics 1975, part 2, pp. 1189-90). It seems 
unlikely that Marylanders could have forecasted such luck. 
  If backing matters, and if subjects used the current accumulation trend in the sinking fund 
as the forecast of the likely end accumulation, then the coefficient on Forecasted Backing when 
used in the Smith-type model should be one. Par was three pounds sterling for every four 
Maryland pounds because Maryland promised to swap sterling for Maryland pounds at that rate 
in 1764. If the sinking fund in 1764 was, for example, 33.3 percent deficient, then Maryland 
could only swap two pounds sterling for every four Maryland pounds—a rate 33.3 percent below 
exchange par. Thus, if backing is what determines value, then the percentage the exchange rate 
was below par in a given year would be the same percentage by which the sinking fund in that 
year was below the trend accumulation needed to just meet the promised redemption in 1764. 
The latter percentage was the percentage by which the sinking fund was forecasted to be 
deficient in 1764.  
  When my measure of backing [Forecasted Backing] and money [MMGp] are used in 





coefficients on both the quantity of paper money and the backing of paper money, by Smith’s 
econometric standards, are statistically significant with the correct sign, see Table 2—Section II, 
Part B. However, the coefficient on Forecasted Backing, while positive, is far from one. 
Therefore, backing, as defined by the forecasting of the likely backing regime shift, appears to be 
of little importance to determining the value of money in Maryland between 1733 and 1764. 
Finally, when this model, or any model in Table 2, is AR1 corrected for serial correlation, 
statistically significant results on both the money and the backing variables disappear. As such, 
the data for Maryland may not be strong enough to tell us anything about backing versus the 
quantity of money.
13 
  MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 
  In the literature on colonial monetary behavior what theoretically differentiates the role 
of backing from that of the quantity of money has not been well articulated. Fiat paper money, 
by definition, assumes some type of backing in order to hold its value above its opportunity 
value. Scarcity of paper alone cannot do it. If scarcity alone determined a money’s value, then it 
would be a commodity money not a fiat money.  Someone, typically the government, must be 
willing to accept fiat paper money for some commodity, service, or (tax) obligation at a rate 
above its opportunity value, such as above paper money’s value as a bookmark or a fire-lighter. 
At this level of analysis, there is no “quantity of money” versus “backing of money” dichotomy. 
Even Fisher’s (1912) world of the classical quantity theory of money assumes that banknotes 
were convertible on demand into gold. Likewise, the “quantity” theorists’ monetary adjustment 
mechanism for the colonial economy discussed above assumes backing, namely, that someone 
was willing to exchange fiat paper money for specie at a fixed rate. In other words, the quantity 





  How backing affects nominal values is presented in two ways. First, for a given quantity 
of fiat money, a change in how money is backed, i.e., a sudden regime shift might alter the value 
of the fiat money (Sargent 1982). It might also change the responsiveness of P, Y, and V to 
changes in MT through altering the degree by which future MT can be anticipated. Second, a 
particular backing regime might dissolve the long-run money-price connection by substituting a 
long-run money-velocity connection in its place (Calomiris 1988a; Laidler 1987; Sargent and 
Wallace 1981; Smith 1985a, 1985b, 1988; Wicker 1985). These two ways tend to be conflated in 
the literature on colonial monetary behavior—for an example, see the analysis of Smith (1985b) 
in the prior section.  
  The first way is least controversial because it does not directly challenge the classical 
quantity theory of money. While the evidence for colonial America is not strong enough to 
support systematic econometric testing, it is highly suggestive that when colonial legislatures 
substantially changed their paper money backing regimes, holding the quantity of paper money 
constant, nominal values changed in the expected direction. For example, Smith (1985a, p. 552; 
1985b, pp. 1189, 1197) identifies likely regime shifts for South Carolina in 1731, North Carolina 
in 1748, and Massachusetts in 1749. Grubb (2003, p. 1786) identifies a likely regime shift for 
Virginia around 1764-1766. Calomiris (1988a) identifies backing regime shifts behind the 
Continental dollar during the Revolution. Massachusetts’ regime shift consisted of going off fiat 
paper money, and South Carolina’s regime shift consisted of being prohibited by Parliament 
from issuing any new paper money. The other regime shifts pre-revolution typically consisted of 
legislatures changing how they redeemed their paper money and what they would accept in 
payment of taxes. In some cases they switched between the policy of taxing the money out of 





they where paid in as taxes (Brock 1975, pp. 33-34, 112-13, 120-23; Ernst 1973, pp. 63-75; 
Perkins 1991, p. 15).  
  One of the clearest demonstrations of this backing regime-shift effect is for Maryland in 
1781. Maryland issued three distinguishable types of paper money, namely, “red” money, 
“black” money, and “state continental” money in 1780-81. The three monies were backed 
differently, some by future taxes and some by the expected sale of confiscated loyalist property, 
and they also traded at differing discounts off their face value. Since, by definition, the total 
quantity of money (all monies) in Maryland was the same relative to red, black, and state 
continental money at any point in time, it is differential backing that likely produced their 
differential discounts (Behrens 1923, pp. 69-77). 
  Most of the backing literature for colonial America, however, does not focus on regime 
shifts, but examines the purported absence of a money-price relationship while holding a 
particular backing regime constant (Smith 1985a, 1985b, 1988; Wicker 1985). Most of the 
colonies and periods examined, such as those of Pennsylvania and Maryland above, had constant 
de facto backing regimes through out.
14  As such, this second way of interpreting how backing 
affected nominal values is more controversial. By stressing that it is the particular regime, and 
not the shift in that regime, that matters, it directly challenges the classical quantity theory of 
money by substituting a long-run money-velocity relationship for the classical quantity theory of 
money’s long-run money-price relationship (Laidler 1987, Sargent and Wallace 1981).   
  The problem with the above approach to backing is that colonial backing regimes served 
two functions concurrently. They served a backing function by holding the value of paper money 
above its opportunity value through paper money’s acceptance for tax obligations, and a quantity 





on this discussion and using the evidence for Pennsylvania in Figure 1, an alternative monetary 
adjustment mechanism will be offered that combines the backing and quantity mechanisms. The 
Pennsylvania legislature could not engage in monetary micro-management in the very short run. 
They also could not defend an exchange rate between paper money and specie in the short run. 
However, they could and did engage in monetary actions in response to large crises, such as 
wars, depressions, and trade shocks (Brock 1975, pp. 74-84, 353-91; Lester 1938; Pennsylvania 
Archives; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania). For example, see Pennsylvania’s response to the 
Seven Year’s War (Wicker 1985) and to the 1772 British Credit Crisis (Neal 1990, pp. 170-71; 
Sheridan 1960) illustrated in Figure 1. Wars and trade shocks were known to be likely near-term 
events, though exactly when they would occur was not easily anticipated. The Pennsylvania 
legislature wanted to have a short-run monetary policy to finance wars, and to counter 
depressions by stimulating Y, but also wanted a credible long-run price-stability policy. To 
accomplish this dual policy, they had to convince their subjects that non-crisis monetary policy 
would undo the unanticipated crisis-year monetary injections such that per capita real cash 
balances would remain constant in the long run. They accomplished this through explicitly tying 
crisis-year monetary injections to taxes and mortgage payments that would be paid in the near-
future non-crisis years. While designed to remove from circulation the prior monetary injection, 
the exact time-path of said removal was hard to forecast. The legislature maintained the 
credibility of this commitment by letting real cash balances decline during non-crisis periods, 
some of which could be quite lengthy, e.g., see 1733-41, 1748-54, and 1762-72 in Figure 1.  
  The particular backing regimes used in colonial America were designed to control the 
quantity of money in the long run, and to provide credibility to this long-run commitment in the 





the quantity of paper money cannot be regarded as independent theories here. They are 
inseparable elements of a given institutional setting that attempted to control the quantity of 
money in the long run, but allow short-run monetary influence over Y.  Whether changes in V 
over the short-run happened to also undo some of the changes in MT as an unintended side effect 
of this monetary policy is still an open question. 
 CONCLUSIONS 
  The long-running debate over the purported failure of the classical quantity theory of 
money in the colonial economy is shown to be a failure of data rather than a failure of theory. 
Only Pennsylvania has enough high-quality data to support econometric testing. For this colony, 
when new data on the quantity of specie is added to the existing data on the quantity of paper 
money and estimated in short- and long-run monetary models, the purported failure of the 
classical quantity theory of money disappears. From 1729 through 1775, per capita total real 
money balances exhibited a stationary process with no trend. The backing theory of monetary 
performance, changes in MT undone by changes in V, is potentially relevant only during short-
run cyclical movements. The data on short-run movements in Y versus V, however, are 
insufficient to gage the magnitude or even the existence of such an effect in the colonial 
economy.  
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TABLE 1.  Replication of Results in West (1978) for Pennsylvania, 1723-1775 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          Regres-  Total   
I. Replication of Results in West (1978, p. 4) for Pennsylvania     sion R
2    R
2 DW 
 
  A. Results Reported by West (1978, p. 4) Using Only Mp for 1723-1774: 
 
     ln(PI(i)) = 5.10
***  -  0.02 ln(Mp(i))       0.00  ----  ---- 
                   (0.63)      (0.07) 
 
     ln(PI(i)) = 4.31
***  -  0.04 ln(Mp(i))  +  0.09 ln(Mp(i-1))     0.05  ----  ---- 
                   (0.70)       (0.06)                   (0.06)  
 
     ln(PI(i)) = 3.42
***  -  0.02 ln(Mp(i))  +  0.08 ln(Mp(i-1))  +  0.06 ln(Mp(i-2)) 0.13  ----  ---- 
                   (0.63)       (0.07)                  (0.05)                     (0.05) 
 
  B. Replication of These Results Using the Same Data and Model:
a 
   
     ln(PI(i)) = 4.29
***  +  0.04 ln(Mp(i))       0.02  0.84  1.77
** 
                   (0.42)         (0.04) 
 
     ln(PI(i)) = 3.39
***  +  0.003 ln(Mp(i))  +  0.11 ln(Mp(i-1))
***    0.23  0.87  1.79
** 
                   (0.50)         (0.05)                    (0.03) 
 
     ln(PI(i)) = 3.37
***  -  0.01 ln(Mp(i))  +  0.10 ln(Mp(i-1))
*  +  0.03 ln(Mp(i-2))  0.14 0.87 1.81
** 
                   (0.57)        (0.05)                  (0.06)                      (0.04) 
 
II. Results of the West (1978, p. 4) Style Model Using MT [= Mp + Ms] for Pennsylvania 
1729-1775 
 
     ln(PI(i)) = 3.23
***  +  0.13 ln(MT(i))
***      0.25  0.86
 1.78
** 
                  (0.44)         (0.04) 
 
     ln(PI(i)) = 2.91
***  -  0.007 ln(MT(i))  +  0.16 ln(MT(i-1))
***    0.41  0.89  1.80
** 
                   (0.38)        (0.05)                     (0.05)  
 
     ln(PI(i)) = 2.79
***  -  0.03 ln(MT(i))  +  0.14 ln(MT(i-1))
**  +  0.05 ln(MT(i-2)) 0.42 0.89 1.80
** 
                   (0.40)        (0.06)                   (0.05)                        (0.05) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*** Statistically significant above the 0.01 level. 
** Statistically significant above the 0.05 level. 





a Coefficient magnitudes and significance levels are not changed when using data for the 
years 1729-1775. 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The R
2s reported by West (1978, p. 4) are 
assumed to be Regression R
2s. All results are AR2 error corrected for serial correlation. See 
Appendix—Table A and text for variable definitions. 





TABLE 2.  Replication of Results in Smith (1985b) for Maryland, 1735-1764 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          Regres-  Total   
I. Replication of Results in Smith (1985b, p. 1,207) for Maryland  sion R
2    R
2 DW 
A. Results Reported by Smith (1985b, p. 1,207): 
 
Par(i)  =   0.310      +  (1.0*10
-6  )MMSp(i)       0.003  ------  0.41 
              (0.346)         (3.8*10
-6  ) 
 
Par(i)   =   0.840
**   +  (1.0*10
-7 )MMSp(i)  -  0.910(F(i)/F(1764))
***
     0.364  ------  1.21 
               (0.412)        (5.0*10
-6 )                  (0.323)  
 
Par(i)   =   0.900
***  -  (9.0*10
-7 )MMSp(i)   -  0.370(F(i)/F(1764))  -  0.430D1748-64
*** 0.671  ------  2.19
** 
                  (0.308)        (3.5*10
-6 )                  (0.285)                    (0.123) 
 
B. Replication of These Results Using the Same Data and Model:
a 
 
Par(i)  =   0.311       +  (1.1*10
-6  )MMSp(i)     0.003  ------  0.54 
              (0.319)          (4.1*10
-6  ) 
 
Par(i)   =   0.710
*     +  (1.1*10
-6 )MMSp(i)  -  0.844(F(i)/F(1764))
***
     0.419  ------  1.30 
               (0.339)         (4.2*10
-6 )                 (0.257)  
 
Par(i)   =   0.811
***   -  (2.6*10
-7 )MMSp(i)   -  0.328(F(i)/F(1764))  -  0.419D1748-64
*** 0.685  ------  2.23
** 
               (0.260)          (3.2*10
-6 )                  (0.247)                    (0.122) 
 
C. Replication of These Results Using the Same Data and Model but for Different Ds: 
 
Par(i)   =   0.742
**    +  (1.8*10
-6 )MMSp(i) +  0.184(F(i)/F(1764))  -  0.847D1744-64
*** 0.738 0.859 2.01
** 
               (0.265)          (2.9*10
-6 )                  (0.307)                    (0.164) 
 
Par(i)   =   0.545
*      -  (2.1*10
-6 )MMSp(i)  -  0.289(F(i)/F(1764))   -  0.439D1753-64
** 0.641  ------  2.08
** 
               (0.282)          (3.5*10
-6 )                 (0.282)                     (0.123) 
 
 
II. The Smith Model Using Alternative Interpolated Values and Backing Measures:
b 
A. Results Using Smith's (1985b, p. 1,207) Measure of Backing (F(i)/F(1764)): 
 
Par(i)  =  -0.289       +  (9.4*10
-6  )MMGp(i)
**      0.142  ------  0.65 
              (9.4*10
-6)      (4.4*10
-6  ) 
 
Par(i)   =   0.110       +  (7.7*10
-6 )MMGp(i)
**  -  0.664(F(i)/F(1764))
***
    0.404  ------  0.94 
               (0.297)          (3.8*10
-6 )                     (0.193)  
 
Par(i)   =   0.093       +  (6.5*10
-6 )MMGp(i)     -  0.438(F(i)/F(1764))    0.141  0.559  1.90
** 
               (0.390)          (5.0*10





B. Results Using an Alternative Rational Expectations Measure of Backing: 
 
Par(i)   =  -0.421       +  (9.5*10
-6 )MMGp(i)
** +  0.024Forecasted Backing(i)
**
  0.289  ------  0.84 
               (0.303)          (4.1*10
-6 )                     (0.010)  
 
Par(i)   =  -0.100       +  (6.1*10
-6 )MMGp(i)     +  0.005Forecasted Backing(i)   0.052 0.540 1.99
**  
               (0.413)          (5.6*10
-6 )                      (0.015)  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*** Statistically significant above the 0.01 level. 
** Statistically significant above the 0.05 level. 
* Statistically significant above the 0.10 level. 
a The slight difference in results is most likely due to how missing values were handled 
by the estimation programs. 
b These interpolated values are reported in the brackets and their construction is 
described in the notes of Appendix—Table B. 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. When Total R
2 is reported this means that the 
results are AR1 error corrected for serial correlation. Par is defined as the percentage the 
exchange rate (e) is below the relevant redemption rate, where the redemption rate is 1.0 
Maryland pound equals 0.75 pounds sterling and e is defined as the “sterling value of a 
Maryland pound note” (Smith, 1985b, p. 1,201). Thus, Par equals [(0.75/e) - 1], which in turn 
equals [(Ex*0.0075) - 1] because e equals (100/Ex), where Ex is the exchange rate taken from 
McCusker (1978, pp. 202-03), see footnote 10 and Appendix—Table B. MMSp equals Smith’s 
interpolation of the quantity of Maryland pounds (bills of credit) in circulation. MMGp equals 
my interpolation of the quantity of Maryland pounds in circulation. (F(i)/F(1764)) equals the value 
of the sinking fund as a percentage of its value in 1764 which was its terminal and maximum 





percentage by which the actual sinking funds accumulated at a given date falls below the linear 
accumulation rate, from 1733 through 1764, needed to fulfill the promised redemption in 1764. 





FIGURE 1. The Growth in Real Money Balances Per Capita: Pennsylvania, 1729-1775 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: See Appendix—Table A for variable definitions. All nominal values are expressed 
in Pennsylvania pounds. For MT, [ln(M) - ln(P) - ln(Pop)] = [ln(Y) - ln(V) - ln(Pop)]. 









APPENDIX—TABLE A.  The Data for Pennsylvania, 1723-1775 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Outstanding  Ratio:  Implied  Total  Currency      Average  Current 
  Pennsylvania Specie  Total  in  Circulation Pennsylvania Price    Commodity  Price 
  Paper Pounds    to  Specie  (Mp + Ms)  Population  Index      in PA Pounds  
Year      [Mp]    Paper    [Ms]     [MT]   [Pop]   [PI]           [P] 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1723   15,000         ----         ----          ----    37,182      89.2       0.6199 
1724   44,915         ----         ----          ----    39,257      95.9       0.6665 
1725   38,915         ----         ----          ----    41,332    110.5       0.7680 
1726   38,890         ----         ----          ----    43,407    110.8       0.7701 
1727   38,890         ----         ----          ----    45,482    107.8       0.7492 
1728   38,890         ----         ----          ----    47,557    101.6       0.7061 
1729   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    49,632      99.2       0.6903 
1730   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    51,707    101.9       0.7090 
1731   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    55,100      91.4       0.6360 
1732   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    58,493      89.9       0.6255 
1733   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    61,886      92.6       0.6443 
1734   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    65,279      95.0       0.6610 
1735   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    68,672      95.0       0.6610 
1736   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    72,065      90.5       0.6297 
1737   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    75,458      94.7       0.6589 
1738   68,890    0.0000            0     68,890    78,851      95.2       0.6624 
1739   80,000    0.0000            0     80,000    82,244      88.9       0.6179 
1740   80,000    0.1071     8,571     88,571    85,637      91.1       0.6402 
1741   80,000    0.0286     2,286     82,286    89,040    111.5       0.7758 
1742   80,000    0.0000            0     80,000    92,443    108.5       0.7550 
1743   80,000    0.0000            0     80,000    95,846      94.8       0.6596 
1744   80,000    0.0000            0     80,000    99,249      92.2       0.6415 
1745   80,000    0.0476     3,810     83,810   102,652     93.0       0.6471 
1746   85,000    0.1250   10,625     95,625   106,055     98.2       0.6832 
1747   85,000    0.1311   11,148     96,148   109,458   109.5       0.7619 
1748   85,000    0.2000   17,000   102,000   112,861   119.7       0.8329 
1749   85,000    0.0339     2,881     87,881   116,264   120.3       0.8370 
1750   84,500    0.0685     5,788     90,288   119,666   120.0       0.8349 
1751   84,000    0.0870     7,304     91,304   126,070   120.8       0.8405 
1752   83,500    0.0326     2,723     86,223   132,474   121.0       0.8419 
1753   82,500    0.0674     5,562     88,062   138,878   117.9       0.8204 
1754   81,500    0.0202     1,646     83,146   145,282   114.4       0.7960 
1755   96,000    0.0805     7,724   103,724   151,686   111.7       0.7772 
1756  147,510   0.1714   25,287   172,797   158,090   111.7       0.7772 
1757  247,013   0.0000            0   247,013   164,494   112.5       0.7828 
1758  312,859   0.2222   69,524   382,383   170,897   115.4       0.8029 
1759  422,911   0.1667   70,485   493,396   177,300   127.4       0.8865 
1760  446,158   0.1351   60,292   506,450   183,703   128.2       0.8920 
1761  408,972   0.0000            0   408,972   189,338   127.3       0.8858 
1762  320,676   0.1042   33,404   354,080   194,973   140.1       0.9748 
1763  264,460   0.0698   18,451   282,911   200,608   137.5       0.9568 
1764  316,082   0.0930   29,403   345,485   206,243   126.9       0.8829 
1765  305,095   0.1341   40,927   346,022   211,878   126.9       0.8829 





1767  258,420   0.1585   40,969   299,389   223,149   132.5       0.9219 
1768  233,934   0.2048   47,914   281,848   228,785   126.0       0.8767 
1769  220,911   0.2300   50,810   271,721   234,421   122.1       0.8496 
1770  201,173   0.4697   94,490   295,663   240,057   128.4       0.8934 
1771  171,871   0.5634   96,829   268,700   248,782   133.2       0.9268 
1772  149,115   0.3596   53,614   202,729   257,507   147.2       1.0242 
1773  135,006   0.7191   97,083   232,089   266,232   141.5       0.9845 
1774  217,633   0.8193  178,302    395,935   274,957   137.7         0.9581 
1775  318,613   0.9872  314,528    633,141   283,682   140.9         0.9662 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: All nominal values are expressed in Pennsylvania pounds. For population 
estimates linear interpolation between the decadal data points is used. Implied Total Specie = 
[(Ratio: Specie to Paper) * (Outstanding Pennsylvania Paper Pounds)], i.e., Ms = Ms/Mp * Mp. 
This method assumes that the velocity of circulation of paper money (Vp) equals the velocity of 
circulation of specie (Vs). Thus, in the quantity theory of money formation (Fisher 1912): 
[Mp*Vp + Ms*Vs] = [Mp + Ms]*V = MT*V. The Average Current Commodity Price is taken 
from the 20 commodity unweighted arithmetic price index for Philadelphia [base year equal to 
1741-45] reported in Bezanson, et al. (1935, pp. 429, 433). This price index is converted to the 
Average Current Commodity Price in PA Pounds by multiplying the index number by the 
summation of the 20 commodity prices for the base year, dividing this number by 100, dividing 
this number by 20 (the number of commodities), and then dividing this number by 20 (to convert 
shillings to pounds). 
Sources: The data on outstanding Pennsylvania pounds are taken from Brock (1975, pp. 
82-83, 386-87; 1992, p. 113); the ratio of specie to paper currency from Grubb (2004); the 
Pennsylvania population from Historical Statistics (1975, part 2, p. 1,168); and commodity 





APPENDIX—TABLE B.  The Data for Maryland, 1735-1764 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Outstanding Notes  Outstanding Notes  Face Value of  Exchange Rate: 
 in Circulation in  in Circulation in  Sinking Fund  Number of Maryland  
  Maryland Pounds:  Maryland Pounds:  in Pounds  Pounds Needed to Buy  
  Smith Interpolations  Grubb Interpolations  Sterling   100 Pounds Sterling 
Year [MMSp]  [MMGp]   [F]     [Ex] 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1735    56,495      56,495    [  1,334]     140.00 
1736   57,864      57,864        2,000    230.00 
1737   69,856      69,856        4,000    250.00 
1738  [69,856]  [74,838]  [  5,000]     225.00 
1739   79,820      79,820        6,000    212.34 
1740   78,523      78,523        7,500    228.08 
1741   83,444      83,444        9,500    238.17 
1742    82,072      82,072    [11,000]   275.00 
1743 [82,252]*   [82,162]    12,500     285.13 
1744   83,058*     82,252      15,000     166.67 
1745    83,058      83,058    [16,900]   200.00 
1746  [83,058]  [84,184]    18,800     210.00 
1747    85,309      85,309      21,000     225.22 
1748    86,040      86,040      24,000     200.61 
1749 [62,000]**   [62,000]**     12,000     184.58 
1750  [62,000]  [62,000]  [11,500]   177.92 
1751  [62,000]  [62,000]    11,000     166.83 
1752  [62,000]  [62,000]  [13,500]   155.62 
1753  [62,000]  [62,000]    16,000     151.75 
1754  [62,000]  [62,000]  [17,750]   153.75 
1755  [62,000]  [62,003]    19,500   [161.88] 
1756 [96,017]    [70,507]***   [19,500]    170.00 
1757  [96,017]  [79,011]    19,500     145.00 
1758  [96,017]  [87,515]    19,500     150.00 
1759  [96,017]  [96,018]  [23,500]   150.00 
1760  [96,017]  [85,074]    27,500     146.25 
1761  [96,017]  [74,130]  [31,500]   148.48 
1762  [96,017]  [63,186]    35,500     144.45 
1763  [62,000]  [52,242]  [38,150]   140.00 
1764    41,295      41,295      40,800     136.67 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
* These values are transcription errors by Smith (1985b, pp. 1,204-05) from the original source. 
** The original source states that in 1749 “…there were some 62,000 in bills, new and old, in 





*** The original source states that the 40,000 in new bills authorized in 1756 “…were not 
thrown at once into Circulation but paid out from time to time to the Troops…”, that total bills in 
circulation reached a peak of 96,018, and that “By October, 1763, the sums arising from the 
various taxes had proved more than sufficient to retire the 30,000 in new bills issued by the act 
of 1756, together with the 4,015 in unexchanged conversion bills that had been paid out.” (Brock 
1975, pp. 418-19). 
Notes: Where data were missing in the original sources, interpolated values are 
substituted in brackets. Simple linear interpolations are used throughout except for [MMGp] 
between 1756 and 1764. The interpolation for these years is derived from the statements in the 
above notes. Smith (1985b, pp. 1,204-05) provided no interpolated values for [F] and [Ex], but 
instead left these values blank. Thus, they were treated as missing values in the replication of his 
econometric results in Table 4—Section I, Parts B and C.  His interpolated values for [MMSp] 
appear to be a combination of filling in missing values with their immediate prior observation for 
observations before 1749, and substituting “authorized” amounts for the amounts actually in 
circulation for observations after 1755. For [Ex] par was defined to be 133.33, or one Maryland 
pound equaled 0.75 pounds sterling. 
Sources: [MMSp] and [F] are taken from Smith (1985b, pp. 1,204-05). [MMGp] and 
[MMSp] are derived from original data in Brock (1975, pp. 104-05, 417-22). [Ex] is from 






     1 The modern protagonists in this debate have added little new or original to the arguments that 
were prevalent and well articulated among the colonists themselves, other than the translation of 
these arguments into modern pedagogy (for just a few of the many examples, see Archives of 
State of New Jersey, 1st series, vol. 5, pp. 120-22, 156-57; Davis 1964, vol. 4, 377-405; Ernst 
1973, pp. 63-64; Marchione 1983, pp. 325-30; various editorials on money in the Maryland 
Gazette between 1780 and 1782 and in the Pennsylvania Gazette between 1739 and 1760; 
Newell 1998, pp. 130-31, 145-46, 214-35; Nussbaum 1957, p. 27; Pennsylvania Archives, 8th 
series, vol. 6, pp. 4516-30; Perkins 1991; Webster 1969, pp. 139-61). The contribution of the 
modern protagonists in this debate is applied. They selectively marshaled the evidence gathered 
by other scholars long ago to support their respective theoretical positions. They, however, 
undertook no econometric estimation or statistical testing, with the notable exception of Smith’s 
(1985b) work on 1735-1764 Maryland—which will be addressed below. 
     2 The post-West (1978) quantitative studies of colonial monetary performance cover the colonies 
of South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Massachusetts (McCallum 1992; Michener 1987; Smith 1985a, 1985b, 1988; 
Wicker 1985). All of these studies, however, are non-econometric and provide no statistical testing, 
with the one exception noted in footnote 1. In addition, price data were not used, because reliable 
price data do not exist, for North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. 








     3 Several reasons account for why my replication of West’s (1978) model differs from his 
original results. West used the Bezanson (1935) price index as reproduced in Cole (1938). I used 
the original price index as reported in Bezanson that differed from that reproduced in Cole by 
being carried to one more decimal place. West used the Brock (1975) data on paper money. I 
used the Brock (1992) data on paper money that corrected Brock’s earlier data for minor errors. 
Finally, West used Cochrane-Orchutt while I used the more efficient Yule-Walker technique to 
correct for serial correlation. 
     
4 The average price rather than the price index is used because the difference between the 
natural logarithm of the index and that of its average price is almost imperceptible, i.e., yielding 
less than a 0.0002 and 0.000005 difference in the coefficient and standard error on the variable t, 
respectively. By using the average price the actual current total-real-money-balance per capita in 
Pennsylvania pounds can be easily calculated by taking e
m for that year. t = (Year - 1728). The 
results also do not perceptibly change when using slightly different sample end points, i.e., 1730-
1775 and 1729-1774. 
     
5 When using Dickey-Fuller critical values for m(i-1) and the Dickey-Fuller F-test, non-
stationarity is rejected. See Enders (1995, pp. 221-23, 257, 419, 421). 
     
6 The variant of the quantity theorists’ model that relies on merchants to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate between paper and specie right up to the point where all specie disappears from 
the colony (Michener 1987, p. 264) is inconsistent with rational expectations. Given an increase 
in the quantity of paper money by the legislature, merchants would revise their expected 







colony over the zero-specie threshold. Given this increased expected likelihood, merchants 
would begin to demand higher prices in paper money per unit of specie well before the zero-
specie threshold was reached, and vice versa. A rational expectations mechanism of monetary 
adjustment by merchant arbitragers would lead to a variable exchange rate between paper and 
specie even when considerable specie was still in circulation in the colony. Thus, paper and 
specie would be less than perfect substitutes, and the door would be opened to changes in the 
quantity of paper money affecting prices even when specie was in circulation. 
     
7 All reported correlation coefficients are statistically different from zero above the 0.02 
significance level. 
     8 The colonial institutional setting is somewhat reminiscent of the system proposed by Friedman 
(1948). It should be noted at this juncture that this institutional linking of V and MT is also not a 
violation of the general quantity theory of money (MT*V = P*Y) or the “equation of exchange” 
as Fisher (1912) called it. The classical assumption that V is not a direct function of MT is 
derived from the particular monetary institutional settings of the 19th and early 20th centuries 
where MT is a function of a loosely regulated fractional-reserve private banking system (Fisher 
1912, Laidler 1987). Most quantity theorists would agree that V not being a direct function of 
MT is neither a universal nor institutionally-invariant condition. Because the colonial economy 
had no banks, no fractional reserve banking, no demand or time deposits, no mints for coinage, 
no government bonds, and so forth, the colonial world was clearly different enough to warrant 
relaxing the classical assumption that V is not a direct function of MT. 
     







were backed, as other colonies backed their bills, through future taxes and land mortgages, and 
not by a sinking fund whose current value was directly measurable. See Brock (1975, pp. 99-
105, 412-28). 
    10 Smith (1985b, pp. 1201-05) states that e denotes the sterling value of a Maryland pound 
note, that the redemption rate is four Maryland pounds for three pounds sterling, that Par = .75e 
– 1, that Par is the percentage the exchange rate is above the relevant redemption rate, and that 
the exchange rate (Ex) is the number of Maryland pounds per 100 pounds sterling (Appendix—
Table B). These statements are mutually inconsistent, and if followed exactly cannot replicate 
his econometric results. It appears that Smith’s statement that [Par = .75e – 1] is erroneous. It 
should be [Par = .75/e – 1] which in turn equals [(Ex*0.0075) - 1] because e equals (100/Ex). If 
[Par = .75/e – 1] is used, then Smith’s econometric results can be replicated. This also implies 
that Par is the percentage that e is below the relevant redemption rate. 
    
11 The same results are found for all subsequent models estimated in Table 2. In addition, the 
standard Chow Test cannot reject the absence of a structural break at 1748 (F-statistic = 2.28). 
The Chow Test is only relevant when using the correctly specified data and variable 
construction, i.e., the last regression reported in Table 2. Dickey-Fuller tests show that from 
1735 through 1765 both Par and ln(Ex) are trend-stationary, and Perron (1989, pp. 1380-83) 
tests show a structural break in these trend-stationary processes at 1748. However, the same 
results are found when the break is modeled to be either in 1749, 1750, or 1743. These results 
are available from the author upon request, or the reader can replicate them directly using the 
data in Appendix—Table B. Finally, even if there were structural breaks in Par and ln(Ex) at 







Maryland’s successful currency redemption or by the shock to real trade flows occasioned by the 
end of the War of the Austrian Succession. In conclusion, Smith’s (1985b) dummy variable 
measure of backing  
[D1748-64] lacks both statistical and interpretive relevance. 
    
12 Tobacco exports grew at under 0.5% per year between 1727 and 1770. Derived from 
Historical Statistics (1975, part 2, pp. 1189-90). See also McCusker and Menard 1985, p. 121. 
On commission fees, see Price (1977). 
    
13 Inspection of the Maryland exchange rate data (McCusker 1978, pp. 202-03) indicates that 
substantial measurement error may be present. The yearly exchange rate in many cases is derived 
from only a single observation in a particular merchant account book, and said observations 
across years are derived from different merchants reporting at different times of the year. 
    
14 For example, the Currency Acts of 1751 and 1764 imposed on the colonies by Parliament 
did not produce effective backing regime shifts in most colonies. These acts required that 
colonial paper money not be made legal tender and that future taxes be put in place to redeem 
said paper money in a timely fashion (Ernst 1973, Wicker 1985, Grubb 2003). Most colonies, 
such as Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York, had been backing and redeeming their paper 
money with explicit future taxes long before these acts. The removal of paper money’s legal 
tender status by these acts also did not produce an effective regime shift. Because colonial 
legislatures had and continued to accept their own paper money in payment of the taxes they 
imposed and land mortgages they held, their paper money had de facto legal tender status for 
public debts. This, in turn, served as an effective nominal anchor for its use as a tender for 
private debts. 
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